| INTRODUCTIONMoral values, rules, principles, and | | | | know one's mental state) is false". Naturally, one |
| judgements are often thought of as beliefs or as true | | | | knows one's mental state better than one knows |
| beliefs. Those who hold them to be true beliefs also | | | | other people's. There is an observational asymmetry |
| annex to them a warrant or a justification (from the | | | | involved. We have non-observational (privileged) |
| "real world"). Yet, it is far more reasonable to conceive | | | | access to our mental state and observational access |
| of morality (ethics) as a state of mind, a mental state. It | | | | to other people's mental states. Thus, we can say that |
| entails belief, but not necessarily true belief, or | | | | we know our morality non-observationally (directly) - |
| justification. As a mental state, morality cannot admit | | | | while we are only able to observe other people's |
| the "world" (right and wrong, evidence, goals, or results) | | | | morality.One believes moral propositions and knows |
| into its logical formal definition. The world is never part | | | | moral propositions. Whether the belief itself is rational |
| of the definition of a mental state.Another way of | | | | or not, is debatable. But the moral mental state strongly |
| looking at it, though, is that morality cannot be defined in | | | | imitates rational belief (which relies on reasoning). In |
| terms of goals and results - because these goals and | | | | other words, the moral mental state masquerades as |
| results ARE morality itself. Such a definition would be | | | | a factive attitude, though it is not. The confusion arises |
| tautological.There is no guarantee that we know when | | | | from the normative nature of knowing and being |
| we are in a certain mental state. Morality is no | | | | rational. Normative elements exist in belief attributions, |
| exception.An analysis based on the schemata and | | | | too, but, for some reason, are considered "outside the |
| arguments proposed by Timothy Williamson | | | | realm of belief". Belief, for instance, entails the grasping |
| follows.Moral Mental State - A SynopsisMorality is the | | | | of mental content, its rational processing and |
| mental state that comprises a series of attitudes to | | | | manipulation, defeasible reaction to new information.We |
| propositions. There are four classes of moral | | | | will not go here into the distinction offered by |
| propositions: "It is wrong to...", "It is right to...", (You should) | | | | Williamson between "believing truly" (not a mental state, |
| do this...", "(You should) not do this...". The most common | | | | according to him) and "believing". Suffice it to say that |
| moral state of mind is: one adheres to p. Adhering to p | | | | adhering to p is a mental state, metaphysically |
| has a non-trivial analysis in the more basic terms of (a | | | | speaking - and that "adheres to p" is a (complex or |
| component of) believing and (a component of) | | | | secondary) mental concept. The structure of adheres |
| knowing, to be conceptually and metaphysically | | | | to p is such that the non-mental concepts are the |
| analysed later. Its conceptual status is questionable | | | | content clause of the attitude ascription and, thus do |
| because we need to decompose it to obtain the | | | | not render the concept thus expressed non-mental: |
| necessary and sufficient conditions for its possession | | | | adheres to (right and wrong, evidence, goals, or |
| (Peacocke, 1992). It may be a complex (secondary) | | | | results).Williamson's Mental State Operator calculus is |
| concept.See here for a more detailed | | | | applied.Origin is essential when we strive to fully |
| analysis.Adhering to proposition p is not merely | | | | understand the relations between adhering that p and |
| believing that p and knowing that p but also that | | | | other moral concepts (right, wrong, justified, etc.). To be |
| something should be so, if and only if p (moral | | | | in the moral state requires the adoption of specific |
| law).Morality is not a factive attitude. One believes p to | | | | paths, causes, and behaviour modes. Moral justification |
| be true - but knows p to be contingently true | | | | and moral judgement are such paths.Knowing, |
| (dependent on epoch, place, and culture). Since | | | | Believing and their ConjunctionWe said above |
| knowing is a factive attitude, the truth it relates to is the | | | | that:"Adhering to p is a conjunction with each of the |
| contingently true nature of moral propositions.Morality | | | | conjuncts (believing p and knowing p) a necessary |
| relates objects to moral propositions and it is a mental | | | | condition - and the conjunction is necessary and |
| state (for every p, having a moral mental relation to p | | | | sufficient for adhering to p."Williamson suggests that |
| is a mental state).Adhering to p entails believing p | | | | one believes p if and only if one has an attitude to |
| (involves the mental state of belief). In other words, | | | | proposition p indiscriminable from knowing p. Another |
| one cannot adhere without believing. Being in a moral | | | | idea is that to believe p is to treat p as if one knew p. |
| mental state is both necessary and sufficient for | | | | Thus, knowing is central to believing though by no |
| adhering to p. Since no "truth" is involved - there is no | | | | means does it account for the entire spectrum of |
| non-mental component of adhering to p.Adhering to p | | | | belief (example: someone who chooses to believe in |
| is a conjunction with each of the conjuncts (believing p | | | | God even though he doesn't know if God exists). |
| and knowing p) a necessary condition - and the | | | | Knowledge does determine what is and is not |
| conjunction is necessary and sufficient for adhering to | | | | appropriate to believe, though ("standard of |
| p.One doesn't always know if one adheres to p. Many | | | | appropriateness"). Evidence helps justify belief.But |
| moral rules are generated "on the fly", as a reaction to | | | | knowing as a mental state is possible without having a |
| circumstances and moral dilemmas. It is possible to | | | | concept of knowing. One can treat propositions in the |
| adhere to p falsely (and behave differently when | | | | same way one treats propositions that one knows - |
| faced with the harsh test of reality). A sceptic would | | | | even if one lacks concept of knowing. It is possible |
| say that for any moral proposition p - one is in the | | | | (and practical) to rely on a proposition as a premise if |
| position to know that one doesn't believe p. Admittedly, | | | | one has a factive propositional attitude to it. In other |
| it is possible for a moral agent to adhere to p without | | | | words, to treat the proposition as though it is known |
| being in the position to know that one adheres to p, as | | | | and then to believe in it.As Williamson says, "believing is |
| we illustrated above. One can also fail to adhere to p | | | | a kind of a botched knowing". Knowledge is the aim of |
| without knowing that one fails to adhere to p. As | | | | belief, its goal. |
| Williamson says "transparency (to be in the position to | | | | |